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Schlinks’s “Der Vorleser” and 
the concept of Truth
Maria Clara Calheiros1
Abstract: Schlink’s novel, “Der Vorleser”, constitutes the starting point from 
which the author wishes to examine the recent debate on historical research and 
writing generated by the law approved by the French parliament that punished 
denial that the 1915-16 killing of Armenians was genocide. The fact is that na-
tions worldwide, including those having democratic and authoritative govern-
ments, appear to be interested in exerting some kind of control on the historical 
narrative of past events. Therefore, this paper aims to engage in a comparative 
study of the meaning of the concept of truth used both in the legal and the his-
torical fields.
Keywords: Schlink Truth History Memory Freedom of Speech
I. Introduction
In early 2012, I followed the press coverage of the lawsuit filed 
against Judge Baltazar Garzón, accused of having initiated a procedure 
to investigate crimes committed during the Spanish Civil War, covered 
by an amnesty law, and simultaneously followed the debate on the pass-
ing of a law by the French National Assembly on the Armenian genocide 
perpetrated by Turkish forces in 1915. To an external observer there was 
some paradox on these two events: while Spanish courts were trying to 
cope with legally mandatory oblivion, French legislators were ensuring 
the perennity of past events narrative through legal ruling.
What I found interesting was noticing that, in both events, there 
were obvious tensions between Law and History, with very different 
scenarios, motivations and interests. Eventually, I became especially in-
terested in memorial laws and tried to understand its aim. And so, a 
question emerged, for which I have sought to find an answer: can law 
1  Associate Professor of law. University of Minho (Portugal) Law School. claracc@di-
reito.uminho.pt. Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine.
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legitimately establish a historical truth? And even if it can, is there any 
benefit to gain from it?
In my analysis, for the sake of brevity, I will be focusing on the 
main arguments submitted in the debate around the laws of historical 
memory, so that I can, at a later stage, approach the issue through the 
contribution that I believe can be extracted from Schlink’s work The 
Reader. This can be of use for two reasons: one internal, or substantial to 
the work itself, concerning what it can tell us about the truth of Law and 
the truth of History; and one external, related to the controversy ulti-
mately generated by the work (revived by its film adaptation a few years 
ago) and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the interpretation it proposes 
of Nazi Germany and, especially, of the issue of managing the problem 
of guilt by the second post-war generation.
 Let us recall, only briefly and in very general terms, the plot of 
this novel: a teenage boy , Michael Berg falls, in love with a woman, 
Hanna Schmitz,who is old enough to be his mother, with whom he lives 
an intense relationship, which is abruptly ended by her, without any ex-
planation. This causes him a certain emotional trauma. Years later, now 
a law student, the protagonist of this account, told in the first person, 
discovers, while following the trial of a group of former Nazi guards, 
that the woman who had been his lover was among those accused of a 
crime of mass murder of women who were prisoners in a concentration 
camp. This event generates a set of contradictory feelings in the protago-
nist, who cannot help loving this woman but simultaneously feels the 
need to repudiate and distance himself from her.
II. Law, History and Truth
It is after this disturbing discovery and faced with the need to 
deal with the consequences it entails, on a personal level, that the pro-
tagonist is confronted with the need to choose his legal profession. This 
is a choice that he will postpone for a long time, until indecision becomes 
unbearable. What I intend to take as a starting point for my analysis of 
the intersection between History, Law and Truth, are the pages of Chap-
ter 4 of Part III of the book, where Michael describes his thoughts about 
the choice he has to make, his doubts and anxieties.
I didn’t see myself in any of the roles I had seen lawyers play at 
Hanna’s trial. Prosecution seemed to me as grotesque a simplifica-
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tion as defence, and judging was the most grotesque oversimplifi-
cation of all. […] That did not leave many legal careers, and I don’t 
know what I would have done if a professor of legal history had 
not offered me a research job. Gertrud said it was an evasion, an 
escape from the challenges and responsibilities of life, and she was 
right I escaped and was relieved that I could do so. […]
Now escape involves not just running away, but arriving some-
where. And the past I arrived in as a legal historian was no less 
alive than the present. It is also not true, as outsiders might as-
sume, that one can merely observe the richness of life in the past, 
whereas one can participate in the present. Being a historian means 
building bridges between the past and the present, observing both 
banks of the river, taking an active part on both sides. One of my 
areas of research was law in the Third Reich, and here it is particu-
larly obvious how the past and present come together in a single 
reality. Here, escape is not a preoccupation with the past, but a 
determined focus on the present and the future that is blind to the 
legacy of the past which brands us and with which we must live.”
Thus, in this excerpt, dominated by an intense feeling of guilt 
and by a pressing need to understand Hanna’s actions, we find the pro-
tagonist at a crossroads, in which he seems forced to opt between a life 
in service to the truth of law (which corresponds to a simplification of 
the truth - especially in what concerns the role played by the judge, as 
the character concludes) or the truth of history, presented as the per-
spective of the legal historian, one that he ultimately ends up choosing 
(perhaps because it liberates him from having to issue a final decision: to 
not take sides, to not judge? That which he is unable to do?) But surely 
because it appears to him as broader, more profound, less reductive. But 
even then, Michael realizes that he will always be too far from any point 
of arrival on his search for an explanation. After all, is this not an escape 
again?
 Back to the present and to reality, keeping in mind the previous 
considerations, let us, thus, analyse the issue of memory laws and, in 
particular, the case of the controversial French law that gave rise to this 
reflection.
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III. Truth and memory laws
States have often shown an interest in establishing an official ver-
sion of history. This has been an old concern throughout the history of 
mankind and it has had several manifestations. European monarchies 
have had official chroniclers and, even before that, the writing of his-
tory had already been ordered from certain individuals. Therefore, the 
State’s interest in history is not new and it continues to have different 
expressions. The Democratic States that emerged in Europe after the 
Second World War took on different roles as guardians of history: pre-
serving vestiges and historical documents, ensuring the proper teaching 
of history, promoting historical research.
One of the most peculiar expressions of this guardianship of 
history by the States took the form of the so-called “historical memory 
laws.” These have been present in different legal systems for decades, 
born as a result of some peoples’ need for reconciliation with dark epi-
sodes of their past and the inherent sense of guilt. Not intending to be 
exhaustive, I recall the cases of Germany, Spain or France.
Despite the good intentions that, one may initially assume, rule 
these initiatives, the fact is that there is no consensus concerning them. 
It is true that what is often at stake is the protection of historical truth, in 
face of all kinds of denial concerning the serious crimes against human-
ity perpetrated in the twentieth century. However, it is equally evident 
that the immediate consequence - we should, in fact, say the only conse-
quence - is restrictions on freedom of expression.
One of the disputed aspects of the recent French law of 2011 
(which established punishments of one year in prison or a 45,000 euro 
fine for anyone who denied the Armenian genocide), eventually con-
sidered unconstitutional by the Conseil Constitutionelle on 28 February 
2012, has to do with the fact that it addresses an issue that did not even 
relate directly to French history. Historian Gilles Manceron wondered 
whether France would create a law for every crime in the world, such 
as those of communism in Russia or the Indian genocide in America. 
For historians, highly critical of this kind of legislative initiatives, the 
real reasons that compel these lawmakers fall outside the scope both of 
historiography and law: it has ties to the political agenda.
Even after the decision of the French Conseil des Sages deeming 
the new law unconstitutional, although based on arguments related to 
the issue of separation of powers and disproportionate limitation of 
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freedom of expression, the controversy remains and some have even 
considered it an opportunity to re-question other historical memory 
laws, in force in France.
But are all memory laws questionable? The opinions of histori-
ans are divided, as some admit that they can make sense in preventing 
the emergence of dormant anti-Semitic movements, for example, while 
others go as far as condemning all legislative interference in this field. 
There is, in the past, at least one example of trial and conviction of an 
historian (Bernard Lewis, professor at Princeton, tried by a Paris Court 
in 1995) for a crime of opinion.
The very Gayssot Act, of 1990, had already been subjected to tren-
chant criticism by historians such as Pierre Vidal-Naquet, condemning 
attempts to establish official truths and, in 2006, a petition was signed by 
19 historians, demanding the repeal of the Gayssot Act, the Taubira Law 
on slavery and also the law demanding the inclusion of references to the 
positive aspects of the French colonization into school textbooks.2
The adoption of “historical memory laws” that intend to estab-
lish certain versions of the past and prevent, or at least restrict, their dis-
cussion was the subject of a lively dispute by historians, who prepared a 
manifesto whose terms are worth remembering:
History is not a religion. The historian accepts no dogma, respects 
no prohibition, knows no taboos. […] History is not the moral. The 
role of the historian is neither to praise nor to condemn but to ex-
plain. The historian is not a slave to the present. The historian does 
not tack onto the past modern ideological formulations or intro-
duce today’s sensitivity into bygone events. History is not mem-
ory. The historian, in scientific steps, gathers people’s memories, 
compares them with each other, juxtaposes them with documents, 
objects, traces and establishes facts. History takes memory into ac-
count but is not reduced to it. History is not a legal object. In a free 
state, neither the Parliament nor the judicial courts have the right 
to define historical truth. State policy – even driven by the best of 
intentions – is not the policy of history”.3
But it was not just historians who felt, with discomfort, that a 
tendency to pass memory laws was emerging. Obviously, the debate 
2  RAIM; Laura, Génocide Arménien: les historiens ne veulent pas la loi, Le Figaro, 
21.12.2011, electronic edition
3  Available at www.ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?article1086
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goes on (with particular interest to us in this respect) also among jurists.
In fact, 56 legal experts from all over France signed an manifesto 
against the adoption of memory laws, considering that what is at stake 
is the free communication of thoughts and opinions. While taking into 
account the need to punish racist behaviours, it is believed that memory 
laws go too far, for, in them, under the guise of the indisputable heinous 
nature of the crime thus recognized, the legislator prevails over the his-
torian in defining historical reality and issuing criminal sanctions based 
on that definition, which prevents not only the most simple and basic 
denial but also the very scientific debate around reality, determining the 
conditions of its development.
 More recently, according to BADINTER(2012), in the absence of 
a judicial ruling with res judicata (as happened in the case of the geno-
cide of the Jews, through the judgments of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg - a jurisdiction created by the London Agree-
ment, of August 1945, and ratified by France), it would not fall to French 
legislature to replace the action of the courts. On the other hand, it is 
stated: “le Parlement français n’a pas reçu de la Constitution compétence pour 
dire l’histoire. C’est aux historiens et à eux seuls qu’il appartient de le faire.” 
(“the French parliament has not been vested by the Constitution with 
the power to write history. Such is the exclusive role of historians.”)4
IV. Truth of History and Truth of Law
So far, we have simply summarized the arguments presented 
within the debate sparked by historical memory laws, largely focused 
on issues related to freedom and its legitimate or illegitimate restric-
tion. We should now adopt another angle for the analysis, which is that 
resulting from the ongoing discussion about the truth of law and the 
truth of history. We thus wonder if there are, after all, many similarities 
between the roles of lawyers and historians?
In truth, it must be said that the comparison and the search for 
similarities between the roles of jurists, especially judges, and historians 
is recurrent in the legal field. Those who have engaged in this endeavour 
generally emphasized that both these players were tasked with ascer-
taining the truth of past events through a set of means, clues or evi-
4  Badinter, Badinter: “le Parlement n’est pas un tribunal”, Le Monde, 14/01/2012, elec-
tronic edition available at www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/01/14/le-parlement-n-
est-pas-un-tribunal-par-robert-badinter_1629753_3232.html, 
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dence, that only provide indirect access to them. A judge would, thus, 
also be involved in a historical research of bygone events, albeit less free 
(mainly limited to the contributions of the parties in the proceedings..., 
and with the leeway permitted by the law of evidence), but still with the 
same contours, assumptions and goals.
Criticism of this view seems necessary and obvious and many 
have expressed it before, so I will also present it here: the goal pursued 
by the historian is broader and, in truth, of a different nature, as he seeks 
not only to establish the singular facts, but rather explain them and 
frame them within their proper context.
In the words of the Portuguese historian José MATTOSO (1997, 
38,39):
In fact, History is no longer, as such, a literary discipline. It does 
not interpret any texts. The past is not a collection of human facts 
that memory retains or imagines, but the sum of those that can be 
deduced from concrete traces, materially imprinted by man on the 
surface of the Earth. […] Now, without establishing a precondition 
for the critical objectivity of data and their association in scientific 
terms, History, made into a mere narrative, is no different from 
fiction. With the disadvantage, in that case, of violating the rules 
of the game, that is, denying its fictional nature.
However, the quest for positiveness in History must not lead us 
to forget that its contact with the past is made through signs and 
representations that mediate reality, and not by a direct examina-
tion of reality itself. Those signs are the marks left by the passage 
of Man, but they are also the very verbal or mental representations 
that allow us to choose which of them are considered representa-
tive. History is, therefore, a representation of representations. It’s 
not exactly science, but knowledge.
The role of history as knowledge and, consequently, the function 
performed by its communicability, paves the way for the examina-
tion of History as art.”5
Thus, it seems we must6 agree with those who advocate that the 
similarity between the roles of judges and historians is more apparent 
(and even illusory) than actual. A comparison between the two inevita-
5
6  TARUFFO, M, la prueba de los hechos, 4ed, Madrid: ed. Trotta, 2011, pp. 336-341.
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bly leads to an unacceptable simplification of the epistemological and 
methodological issues inherent to historiography7 and to the judicial ap-
plication of law.
 This is the moment to go back and recall the excerpt we have 
transcribed from “The Reader” and the character´s dilemma pictured 
there. It seems to us that the above mentioned simplification is precisely 
what the protagonist wants to avoid by choosing the profession of his-
torian of law. 
More than anything, the truth of law is never dissociated from 
the truth of the lawyer. Therefore, it can never have the same nature as 
historical truth. As we know, in Law, a fact is never sufficient in itself; 
instead, they are always hopelessly juridical. Let us recall the lesson of 
Professor CASTANHEIRA NEVES concerning the relationship between 
matter of fact and matter of law:
When considering the matter-of-fact, the matter-of-law is implic-
itly present and relevant; when considering the matter-of-law, the 
joint influence of the matter-of-fact is indispensable. Or in a much 
more expressive formulation: “To tell the truth, “pure fact” and 
“pure law” are never found in legal affairs: fact does not exist but 
from the moment it becomes a matter of application of law, and 
law is moot if there is no application of fact; so when the lawyer 
thinks of fact, he thinks of it as a matter of law, and when he thinks 
7  In fact, historians have been questioning the nature of historical truth for some time. 
There can be identified three different lines of attack on truth of history. The first one 
is based on the recognition of the constraints of evidence, meaning that historians have 
to find evidence which will enable them to draw inferences about the facts that interest 
them. The second one consists of the acknowledgement of the constraints of culture. In 
fact, historians have started to question whether their descriptions and inferences were 
not somewhat tainted by their own cultural circumstances. The last one is based on 
the constraint of language and was essentially drawn by postmodern philosophers like 
Roland BARTHES, Jacques DERRIDA and Jean-François LYOTARD.  Barthes, for in-
stance, argued that historians’ description of past events represent a serious of concepts 
about the past but not the past itself. As historians don’t generally recognize that they 
are just describing their ideas about the past, they generate a misleading effect on read-
ers, convincing them that they are reading descriptions of reality. Furthermore, words 
do not refer to things in the world but just to concepts. In that sense, the truthfulness 
of any description depends on the meaning of the words in a certain culture and time.
DERRIDA also pointed out that historical descriptions are in fact based upon others 
texts, mainly reports of people’s experiences. Cfr. MCCULLAGH, C. Behan, The truth of 
History, London/New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 13-42.
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of law, he thinks of it as the form intended for fact”8
Note that we are not addressing the issue of debating the truth of 
norms, where ontological and epistemological arguments are wielded 
(is there a normative reality? is normative knowledge possible?), 9but 
whether the establishment of a historical truth can legitimately be the 
object of a law. It seems undeniable that there is a certain historicity in 
the role of the jurist, especially the judge, inasmuch as legal proceedings 
recurrently entail a retrospective analysis of legally relevant events (as 
we have mentioned before). To put it simply, in this case, the goal is to 
extract certain legal consequences that follow from the establishment 
that certain events have occurred in the past. And that will make all the 
difference.
Let us frame the question within the scenario we were initially 
considering. In the case of historical memory laws, one might rightly 
argue that it is not only the matter of the knowledge - in and by itself 
- of the truth that is in question, but rather the establishment of guilt 
in the production of certain events and crimes against humanity. But, 
then, should it fall to the legislator or the judge to rule on those same 
events? Moreover, shouldn’t it be up to an international body, rather 
than a third country, to play the role of arbiter?
Although a legitimate concern over the resurgence of radical 
movements, with racist, xenophobic and others of an equally discrimi-
natory nature may deserve some understanding, we are forced to objec-
tively recognize that, by giving legislature a say in the establishment of 
historical truths, we allow Law to invade the field of history and crys-
8  Castanheira Neves, Questão (...), p. 55-56. In conclusion, the author advocates that: 
“Law is not an element, but a synthesis; not a premise for validity, but fulfilled validity 
(...); not prius, but posterius, not data, but a solution; not a starting point, but an out-
come; it is not in the beginning, but in the end. (...) Thus, the methodological nonsense 
of the normative-subsuntive scheme becomes evident. It is not “law” that is set apart 
from “fact”, as law is the normative-material synthesis in which “fact” is also an element, 
the very synthesis that is critically prepared and supported by the problematic distinc-
tion. And if we want to refer law to its previously accomplished objectifications (norms, 
institutions, precedents), then it must be taken into account that we can only think in 
juridical terms if we reestablish, within these objectifications of established legislation, 
that same constitutive problematic (and that same distinction).” Castanheira Neves, 
Questão (...), p. 586.
9  On this debate, summarized, PINTORE, Anna, El derecho sin verdad, Madrid: insti-
tuto Bartolomé de las Casas, Dykinson, 2005, pp. 40 e seq.
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tallize a necessarily simplified version thereof, leaving no room for nu-
ances and deep insights, be it in History itself or in Art (as is also the case 
of fictional works such as The Reader).
In the case of memory laws, what seems worth pointing out is 
that legislature fixes an image of the past from which there are no con-
crete legal consequences, other than the prohibition to deny the inter-
pretation given to the events in question, in the future. The only visible 
immediate result is produced in the jurisdiction of each individual, im-
posing restrictions on freedom of expression.
What kind of truth is that? It is certainly not one that is recog-
nized as legal (it’s extra-procedural, and oblivious to the adversarial na-
ture of fact-finding in legal procedures contradiction), nor as historical 
(it is immutable and oblivious to the scrutiny of sources). Truths estab-
lished by memory laws seem to serve neither Law nor History.
V. Memory laws: misunderstandings and risks
We further insist on the need to approach the issue from a differ-
ent perspective: is there a protection of History here? Of its incorrupt-
ibility?
In our opinion, only apparently. The exercise seems to entail a 
betrayal or at least a misunderstanding of the very spirit of historiog-
raphy. Moreover, currently, the real problem of researchers’ freedoms 
and of the boundaries imposed on them seems to reside in much subtler 
aspects than the protection of official versions of History by legislature. 
Indeed, the very freedom of research and the ensuing reflection are es-
sential elements for greater historical objectivity. The real problem, once 
again, has to do with the market. Judith SHULEVITZ tells us that today, 
in the United States, who decides the topics that students must write 
about “are the customers of Barnes and Noble”.10 Perhaps it is this mar-
ket dictatorship, and its harmful effects on investigations, that we (or 
legislature) should be worried about.
Stiina LOYTOMAKI11 has correctly pointed out the dangers of 
10  Apud Noiriel, Gérard, Sobre la crisis de la historia, Madrid: Ed. Cátedra, 1997.p.199
11  Cfr. Law and memory, The Politics of Victimhood, 21 Griffith L. Rev. 1 2012, p. 18. We 
agree with the author when she states that “legal engagements in memory and identity 
politics tend to give rise to competition between victims and to heightened tensions 
concerning identity politics, leading to further polarisation of particular groups against 
each other and the state”. Ibidem, p. 19.
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manipulating memory and history through law. “The law turns private 
memories into public narratives”, she says and adds “However, resorting to 
identity politics through the law is particularly efficient because the law, as 
noted above, forces particular groups’ narratives to be recognized in universal 
terms. In historical discourse, there is no equivalent universal vocabulary to 
the one existing within law. Consequently, voices or narratives of particular 
agents, although celebrated for their particularity, can also be dismissed because 
of their ‘subjectivity’ and perspectivity.” Law is, therefore, being used in a 
battle for recognition of past injustices. Memory constitutes often the 
basis of group identities based on victimhood.
On the other hand, there are obvious risks involved in an attempt 
to condition or restrict historical readings. One of them is a chance of it 
leading to aimless control that intends to establish itself as the censor 
of the very exercises of human creativity, namely Art and, particularly, 
literature.
Let us return once more to The Reader, this time, to analyse a few 
external aspects, namely, the controversy that surrounded it.
“The Reader” triggered widespread academic controversy sur-
rounding the issues of guilt and shame. Even refraining from entering 
the dispute over the true interpretation of the text, and its possible hid-
den agenda, the work also seems to be easily associated with what some 
call secondary anti-Semitism. This can be defined as a backlash against 
the Jews, which feeds on the fact that the German Holocaust reminds the 
Germans of their guilt and prevents the full assimilation of the German 
identity12.
12  MUELLER, Agnes, Forgiving the Jews for Auschwitz? Guilt and Gender in Bernhard 
Schlink’s Liebesfluchten 2007, 511-513. The summarizes the reasons that sustain current 
ongoing scholarly debate on Schlink’work: “Bernhard Schlink’s international bestseller 
Der Vorleser (1995) sparked an important scholarly discussion on guilt, shame, and the 
so-called “ Vergangen heitsbewltigung.” In this debate, the text received praise for can-
didly taking on the subject of post-WWII German guilt and shame (Bartov, Niven, and 
Schmitz), yet was criticized for reintroducing familiar or tainted clichés and for afford-
ing Germans an easy way out of their feelings of guilt by turning them into “victims” of 
the Nazi regime (Schlant, Arnds, Donahue, Metz). These debates have not reached any 
definite conclusions for two reasons. First, they are intrinsically connected to how we 
read and how we identify with literary texts, urgent questions when it comes to literature 
dealing with the Holocaust, as Dominick LaCapra’s work on writing trauma reveals con-
vincingly. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, if we understand literature to be the 
turf on which important matters of memory and identity are teased out and negotiated, 
and the interpretation of literature (by scholars and critics) as the field where this nego-
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Indeed, once again, The Reader is a good example of a text that 
was subject to criticism and accused of revisionism or “bleaching” of 
German guilt. In this sense, Cynthia OZICK published an article (The 
Rights of History and the Rights of Imagination), addressing the fact that 
SCHLINK’s novel leads us to feel empathy for a Nazi murderer. This 
author draws a very clear boundary between history and fiction, and 
the latter does not have to move within the limits of reality. There is, 
however, in her opinion, an exception: the historical novel, in which the 
aim is to “embody” history. In this field, there would be an added duty 
to respect factuality and historical truth. Thus, the author calls into ques-
tion SCHLINK’s true intentions in creating an atypical and inconsistent 
main character - the guard Hanna, who is an illiterate woman in a nation 
of educated people. Her conclusion points towards the manipulation of 
the reader, thus conditioned to feel empathy towards such a character13.
Not wanting to excuse myself from getting to the bottom of the 
issue, i.e., whether or not the novel appears to be absolving the action 
of the German population during the Second World War, what straight 
away seemed disturbing to me when reading this book was precisely 
the fact that she leads us (by denying the reader access to Hanna’s dark 
past) into a confrontation of mixed feelings of empathy and revulsion 
towards that woman. In fact, it seems to me that the work (most likely 
intentionally, given the author’s circumstances) evokes the philosophi-
cal debate and controversy surrounding Hannah ARENDT and her 
book Eichmann in Jerusalem. A report on the banality of evil. In it, ARENDT 
seeks to address the need to deal with the behaviours of ordinary people 
tiation is further reflected upon, then the continued debate on guilt and shame in Der 
Vorleser points to the fact that the difficulties Germans have with their history, memory, 
and identity are both ongoing and in need of further exploration.”p. 511
13  OZICK says: If virtually universal literacy was the German reality, how can a novel, 
under the rules of fiction, be faulted for choosing what is atypical? […] Characters come 
as they will, in whatever form, one by one; and the rights of imagination are not the 
rights of history. A work of fiction, by definition, cannot betray history. Nor must a novel 
be expected to perform like a camera. […] It would seem, though, that when a novel 
comes to us with the claim that it is directed consciously toward history, that the divide 
between history and the imagination is being purposefully bridged, that the bridging is 
the very point, and that the design of the novel is to put human flesh on historical nota-
tion, then the argument for fictional autonomy collapses, and the rights of history can 
begin to urge their own force. […] and that the unlettered woman in Schlink’s novel is 
the product, conscious or not, of a desire to divert from the culpability of a normally 
educated population in a nation famed for Kultur.
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(which Hanna is, undoubtedly), who, in different circumstances (other 
than in a totalitarian society that tolerated and endorsed the most abhor-
rent crimes) would not commit crimes.
It is generally accepted 14 that Hanna ARENDT failed to explain 
why some lose their ability to think and judge when in the context of a 
totalitarian society and others do not. SCHLINK’s The Reader certainly 
does not offer any explanation. That could only come from Hanna, who 
explains nothing. But the work is effective in causing perplexity due to 
being confronted with “the banality of evil”.
The reader’s perception of his empathy towards a woman with a 
past such as Hannah’s is disturbing, not because we are tempted to ex-
cuse her, but because we find that the face of someone who is capable of 
committing the most despicable crimes can be kind, or simply normal. 
Personally, I do not think that such reasoning should be repressed 
or that it constitutes any kind of revisionism (but there is a danger that 
men without memory who enforce memory laws might think so), but is 
rather a way to remind us that no society, no civilization is exempt or 
safe from the possibility of embarking on the same monstrous adventure 
and, therefore, must be vigilant. In this sense, “The Reader” can be seen 
as a contribution to the contemporary movement of legal narratology, 
according to which, knowledge is so intensely personal, that it cannot be 
communicated through dispassionate reasoning, but only through the 
telling of stories that are themselves, inspirers of credibility.
Let us return to the philosophy in Hanna ARENDT. The author 
tells us: “The judges were obviously aware of how it would be com-
forting to believe that Eichmann was a monster, [...] The problem in 
Eichmann’s case was that there were many like him, and these many 
were neither wicked nor sadistic, they were, and still are, terribly nor-
mal, frighteningly normal. From the point of view of our institutions 
and our moral values, this normality is much more terrifying than all 
the atrocities put together, as it implies (as was stated many times at the 
Nuremberg trials by the defendants and their lawyers) that this new 
type of criminal, being, in fact a hostis humani generis, commits crimes 
under circumstances that make it impossible for him/her to know or feel 
that he/she are acting wrongly.”15
14  Araújo, António e Nogueira de Brito, M., Arendt in Jerusalem, in Eichmann in Jerusa-
lem. A report on the banality of evil, Portuguese edition, Lisbon: Tenacitas, 2003, pp.26 
and 27.
15  Arendt, H., op. Cit., p. 355 and 356.
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VI. Conclusions.
As the main character of Schlink’s book struggles with the need 
to cope with his nation’s past and his own feelings towards the former 
Nazi guard Hanna, he hesitates endlessly about his career. In doing so, 
the character seems to be particularly aware of the challenge that consti-
tutes establishing truth in the legal world. The paper focus on the char-
acter’s dilemma as it enlightens the debate on the connection between 
legal and historical truth.
Indeed, and returning once more to the text of “The Reader”, it 
becomes clear, in my view, that one admits that there is a difference 
between the positioning of the historian (even that of a historian of 
law), and that of the judge or lawyer, before the truth. The protagonist’s 
choice of History of Law as a career path (in any case, an uncommon or 
unlikely choice, as other alternatives would be more attractive economi-
cally or even in terms of social prestige - as some exegetes of the book 
have pointed out16) appears to result from the choice of a less “simplis-
tic” or “reductive” conclusion.
Assuming that no one possesses absolute truth, historical truth 
appears as a truth constructed from the parts of truth held by each indi-
vidual, almost as if it were a puzzle.17 That is, as a whole which is con-
structed by juxtaposing the pieces we can find.
In recent years, collective memory has become the subject of a 
vivid debate, as it has been used as the basis to establish group identity. 
Law is recognized as an important tool in this battle. It is certainly true 
that, due to its specific characteristics, resorting to the legal arena allows 
to generalize and universalize victimhood experiences. But not with-
out a cost. As LOYTOMAKI says “The cost of playing identity politics 
through the law is precisely that historical complexity is lost.18”
16  Vd., ROTH, J Reading and misreading The Reader, “Law and Literature”, 6: “Choosing 
his profession after graduation, Michael rejects lawyer, judge, and prosecutor and choos-
es to become a legal historian. He will delve into thepast to uncover the truth.”p.169.
17  Cf. on this matter, Montoro Ballesteros, Verdad, método y conocimiento práctico, 
Murcia: DM editor, 2008, p. 18 and 19.
18  LOYTOMAKI, op.cit., p.19.
